NAME:

(1)/(2) X Y (1)/(2) X Y
U (3,1,1) (2,3,2) U (1,1,1) (-2,2,2)
M (2,-1,3) (3,1,2) M (-1,3,3) (1,2,3)
D (2,-1,-1) (1,1,2) D (-1,2,-1) (1,1,2)
L (3) R

(a) Is the game above weak dominance solvable? Explain each step.
(b) Find all pure strategy Nash equilibria, if any.

**ANSWER:**

(a) The game is NOT weak dominance solvable.

Step 1. For player 1, D is weakly dominated by M. For player 3, L is weakly dominated by R. Eliminate both. Reduced game is

(1)/(2) X Y
U (1,1,1) (-2,2,2)
M (-1,3,3) (1,2,3)
D (-1,2,-1) (1,1,2)

(b) There is NO pure strategy Nash equilibrium.