Joint with Center for Economic Design (CED)

 

May 16, 2008

 

"Getting Better Students by Offering Lower Scholarship"

H. Doruk İriş and İpek Özkal-Sanver

 

Abstract

We consider a two-sided many-to-one matching model where universities offer scholarships to students. We show that every stable matching rule is manipulable by a university via destroying and predonating endowments under a fairly wide class of scholarship rules. Furthermore, we show that the set of Nash equilibria of the destruction game and the set of stable matchings may be disjoint. We also show that there exist a stable allocation which is manipulable by a university via destroying as well as via predonating endowments whenever the scholarships are determined endogenously in the model.

Keywords: University-admission problem, Endowments, Manipulation.
JEL classification: C78